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SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/ECC, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA
DOE FOR NA-20 LOONEY, NA-20.1 KOONTZ,
NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS,
NA-25 HUIZENG/VOGLER,
NA-24-WHITNEY/GOOREVICH/PERRY/O'CONNOR/LAMONT AGNE
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN
ISLAMABAD FOR DOE - DALTON

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [AORC](#) [PTER](#) [KNNP](#) [ENRG](#) [TRGY](#) [IAEA](#) [KCRM](#) [SNAR](#) [PK](#)
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN - IAEA AND UNODC EFFORTS TO HELP GOP COUNTER
NUCLEAR TERRORISM

SUMMARY

1. (SBU) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has several ongoing activities with Pakistan that deal with nuclear and radiological security, training, regulatory development, safety, and equipment certification. Another Vienna-based International Organization, UNODC, is engaged with Pakistan in port and container security. UNODC continues to lobby for U.S. support for the container program, specifically an in-kind contribution of C-30 kits. The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security (ONS) has been working with Pakistan, particularly the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), on activities related to security of nuclear and radiological material. To date, the IAEA has been unable to gain knowledge about specific locations of radiological sources in Pakistan. An ONS trip planned for June, at Pakistani invitation, will aim to improve IAEA's information on source locations and types; Mission is emphasizing to ONS the importance of improved awareness of vulnerable sources. The IAEA activities outlined in Para 2-11 include the work that is being done directly with Pakistan and training events Pakistani officials have attended. This catalogue of activities is intended as a baseline for those in Washington and Islamabad looking at questions of nuclear security in Pakistan. End Summary.

IAEA Nuclear Security Activities in Pakistan

2. (SBU) Joint IAEA-PNRA Project: "Development of National Program of Sustainable Development in Nuclear Security through education, training and supply of services."
This activity involves training on developing nuclear security regulations and supply of nuclear security equipment in accordance with the IAEA support plan. Activities included in this task aim to create a pool of Pakistani nuclear security specialists, trained in physical protection of radioactive sources, nuclear materials and facilities. Another important goal is to qualify a large group of operators and regulators from Pakistan to use modern detection and radionuclide identification equipment to combat illicit trafficking of radioactive materials.

3. (SBU) The IAEA-PNRA Partnership Program for Human Resource Development in the field of Nuclear Security.
This project focuses on developing a national capacity to implement PNRA's Nuclear Security Action Plan through training courses,

on-the-job training, fellowships, scientific visits and technical advice for establishment of training laboratories and procurement of equipment. The program includes an effort to increase the number of PNRA junior staff trained in IAEA Incident and Emergency Center and Nuclear Security Equipment Laboratory activities.

14. (SBU) Safety and Security of Research Reactors (RR) under Project and Supply Agreement (PSA).

This activity assists Pakistan in the assessment of nuclear safety and security status of the PSA reactors and associated sites, including their physical protection, and identification of issues on operational and regulatory levels. The IAEA and Pakistan are also discussing HEU-to-LEU conversion and spent fuel return problems. The IAEA has a plan under development for better coordination of IAEA assistance for upgrading safety and security systems of research reactors. The final version of the IAEA Technical Assistance Plan is expected to be completed by the end of 2009.

15. (SBU) National Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials for Pakistani participants, Beijing, China in December 2008.

This course trained participants in the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials and promoted understanding of the methodology used in establishing an effective national physical protection program. Twenty participants from PNRA and other relevant organizations of Pakistan participated.

16. (SBU) Establishment of a mobile laboratory in Pakistan for responding to radiological incidents.

This project will design and equip one PNRA vehicle with the necessary detection and response-related equipment for responding to radiological incidents. A PNRA team visited France in January 2009.

A French CEA team was expected to visit Pakistan in April 2009 to follow up.

17. (SBU) Detection Equipment for PNRA's Nuclear Security Action Plan, Phase I.

This project provided a set of basic radiation detection equipment, which is now available with PNRA for use. Some of the equipment will be used by front line officers to combat illicit trafficking at the northern borders of Pakistan and the remainder will be used at the PNRA's nuclear security training center in Islamabad.

18. (SBU) Detection Equipment for PNRA's Nuclear Security Action Plan - Phase II.

This project will provide a set of basic radiation detection equipment for the implementation of PNRA's Nuclear Security Action Plan. Following the agreement with PNRA, the required equipment and specifications were agreed by PNRA and the IAEA. The equipment was procured, tested, accepted and shipped to Pakistan.

19. (SBU) Establishment of Nuclear Security Equipment Training, Certification, Maintenance, Repair Laboratory at the PNRA Nuclear Security Training Centre, Islamabad.

This prospect supports PNRA in building capacity for training, certification, maintenance and repair of detection equipment used in combating nuclear terrorism. A proposal for training, certification, and maintenance of a repair lab for radiation detection equipment for the PNRA Nuclear Security Centre, Islamabad, has been prepared by PNRA and is being finalized.

110. (SBU) Illicit Trafficking Information Management and Coordination Workshop, in Sri Lanka, September 2008.

This workshop was focused on strengthening states' capacities to combat nuclear trafficking through enhanced information management and coordination. The workshop was hosted by the Sri Lankan Atomic Energy Authority and attended by 25 representatives of regulatory and law enforcement agencies from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The IAEA held bilateral meetings with delegations on the margins of the workshop to discuss outstanding issues related to information cooperation. The workshop substantially improved participants understanding of the ITDB processes and reporting requirements, which should result in the improved reporting in the future.

111. (SBU) Regional Workshop on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Facilities, Jakarta, Indonesia in November 2008.

The purpose of this training course, which included Pakistani participation, was to provide concepts and technology focusing on national obligations to establish and strengthen state systems of nuclear material accountancy and control (SSACs) and physical protection arrangements, to account for and control nuclear material in the State, and to contribute to the detection of possible losses, or unauthorized use or removal of nuclear material.

UNODC Activities in Pakistan

¶12. (SBU) The UNODC Container Control Program is currently working in Pakistan on several activities relevant to nuclear smuggling. A Project Document was signed by involved Pakistani agencies and UNODC in September 2007. The Pakistan program has been rolled into a wider subregional program covering Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan (ECO countries). UNODC agreed to establish Port Control Units in Karachi, Port Qasim and in seven dry ports (Torkham, Chaman/Quetta, Sust, Lahore, Sambrial, Faisalabad and Multan), since the dry ports are linked to the seaports in the national transport network. A technical needs assessment was completed for the seaports of Karachi and Port Qasim and the dry ports in Lahore, Faisalabad and Sambrial. The remaining dry ports have not been assessed due to the security situation not allowing UN staff to visit these places.

¶13. (SBU) The training program commenced in January 2008 with a three-week theoretical training workshop completed in Dubai. UNODC (in coordination with the World Customs Organization) trained 38 officials from the Pakistani Customs and the Anti-Narcotic Force (ANF). There are ongoing negotiations between Pakistan Customs, ANF and UNODC about the establishment of Port Control Units (PCUs), establishment of the Steering Committee, procurement of equipment

(UNODC) and the Government contribution. UNODC/WCO assisted in establishing four PCUs (2 Customs units and 2 ANF units) at Karachi and Port Qasim, equipped with with basic search and safety equipment, computers etc. Training was also undertaken in the use of the information sharing mechanisms (ContainerComm). The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security has been involved in the Pakistan project, including in nuclear/radiological training at all the seaports and dry ports. Law enforcement officials working in these locations will be trained by the IAEA in a similar manner to UNODC training on drug-related matters.

¶14. (SBU) In 2009, there was follow-up practical training in January (19 officials trained) and March (14 officials trained). The units are currently fully operational (equipped and trained) and working based on modern methodologies in the area of profiling of containers. All four units have been operational since March 2009. UNODC is currently planning for a Work Study Tour for selected officials to the container port in Antwerp (16 officials) in May and for the initial theoretical training in Lahore for "dry port officials," tentatively scheduled to take place in July 2009. Additionally, follow-up training in Lahore is targeted for October ¶2009.

¶15. (SBU) There is also ongoing procurement of technical equipment - some of the equipment through headquarters and some through the UNODC office in Islamabad. However, UNODC has faced problems in procuring HazMatId kits and therefore continues to lobby for a U.S. in kind contribution of C-30 kits. According to UNODC officials, a contribution of C-30 kits (www.sasrad.com/products/ct30.htm) would greatly assist in accelerating the pace of the training program in Pakistan. Currently, Canada remains the largest donor (approximately U.S. \$2 million) to the UNODC container training program in Pakistan. Given the growth of the program there, UNODC now faces a shortfall of approximately U.S. \$1 million. Note: The European Commission has fully funded (approximately U.S. \$3 million) the UNODC's related regional training programs in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Kazakhstan. Canada has also partially funded the Turkmenistan portion of the program (approximately U.S. \$500,000), but currently a shortfall of approximately U.S. \$500,000 remains. End Note.

Comment

¶16. (SBU) As indicated above, IAEA/ONS and UNODC activities in

Pakistan are extensive and currently cover several aspects of nuclear and radiological security. Assessing the quality of the training and materials ONS is providing to Pakistan and the overall benefits of the cooperation is impossible from Vienna, and we would welcome views from Islamabad and Washington. ONS informs us it will undertake a trip to five radiological sites (current locations unknown) in June; Mission will pursue more information about the location of radiological sources with which IAEA is concerned after that trip. Meanwhile, as the U.S. currently provides no funding for the UNODC container control program, an in-kind contribution of C-30 kits for use in Pakistan would send a much needed positive signal regarding our support for the program. End Comment.

SCHULTE